20c • JANUARY 4, 1954

RUSSIA AND THE ATOM

New Republic



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• *Leon Keyserling Analyzes the Economic Outlook for Next Year*

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T. R. B. *Washington Wire*

What's the outlook for 1954? On the international front there's a tendency for tension to relax without any of the problems being solved. Simultaneously there's an Eisenhower policy toward retrenchment and disengagement. Americans are weary of sacrifice. Curiously, the same tendency appears in Russia. Moscow is now rushing in consumer goods, even exporting gold to buy them. The inarticulate Russian masses want butter, not guns. This is a hopeful sign because it means Communism seeks no frontal war—for the time anyway.

But Moscow simultaneously wants to keep the free world off balance, and now comes the latest thrust, the invasion of the Republic of Laos in Indo-China. Will the UN do anything? Only if Washington takes the lead. The Eisenhower-Dulles disengagement policy makes anything but monetary aid doubtful.

In India, which is walking a knife-edge between democracy and Communism, America's policy of giving military aid to Pakistan is an active force damaging Nehru and aiding Communism. A logical argument can be made for military aid to Pakistan; the question is whether this is a situation susceptible to logic. The same type of hard-boiled chauvinistic Republican who blamed Acheson for the "loss" of China now seems hell-bent on promoting Communism among 300 million Indians.

The year 1954 starts with one crucial point settled: all military plans are based on atomic weapons. Make no doubt of it. Maybe there will be no more world wars. But if one comes, it will be an A-bomb war. On the basis of efficiency and "economy" the US military establishment is being retooled for atomic strife.

That brings us to 1954 in relation to the national economy. The Administration is lopping off soldiers and foreign aid to save money. It made extravagant election promises to cut taxes, strengthen defenses and balance the budget. And now these promises can't be met. We predicted what would happen a year ago. The only real places to economize are in defense and foreign aid. Even with meat-ax cuts here (such as are in prospect) the Eisenhower promise to balance the budget can't be fulfilled.

Let's look at tax cuts. The significant thing here is that the rich are getting the big tax cuts and the poor are being handed the higher bill for social-security payments. For example, there is to be a 10-percent cut in individual income taxes January 1 which means a lot for a millionaire and exactly $6 for a $3,000-a-year couple with two dependents. Meanwhile the social-security rate is going up, which adds $15 a year for the aforesaid $3,000-a-year breadwinner, and doesn't touch the millionaire. The "big tax cut" which all the papers are hailing leaves the little man out of pocket, when it is cancelled out by higher social-security payment.

Finally, the excess-profits tax ends for business. This is a godsend for big corporations. Suppose General Motors earns $2 billion in 1954. Under 1953 rates it would hand over 75 percent of this ($1.5 billion) in federal taxes. With EPT removed it will hand over maybe $1.1 or $1 billion. It has a bonus of $400 million or so to play with. Will it pass this on to consumers in lower prices? Or will it use it to cushion the cost of a destructive strike, if workers fight against cuts in real wages during a "readjustment"?

Trade unionists are not complaining because social-security contributions are going up; they want it that way. But the fact remains that at an ominous time in the national economy when a professional economist like Sen. Paul Douglas (D., Ill.) says a "real recession" is already here, the tax-cut benefits are pouring out to rich men and rich corporations and not to the consuming masses who keep up purchasing power. The situation could be reversed if personal exemptions under income-tax law were raised: that would aid the poor man in the low income brackets; it would have little effect on the wealthy.

So much for 1954 in world affairs and in economic affairs. How about politics? We look for extreme bitterness in the coming session of Congress, climaxed in the November election with Democratic capture of the House. It will be a bitter interval partly because the GOP has too thin a majority to be magnanimous to opponents, and because it is too divided internally, we think, to create the "progressive, dynamic" program Ike seeks. The Republican alternative is for more McCarthyism and Brownellery.

Sometimes we get a bit scared by the poisonous nature of the Republican attack. In no other two-party democracy today, we believe, does such an ugly situation exist. It started with Ike's marriage-of-convenience with McCarthy. Then Brownell took it up. What he did was, in the words of Walter Lippmann, "a truly terrible thing to do." Brownell made public secret, untested police files for partisan political purposes. A cabinet officer who did this in Ottawa, in London, in Holland or in Scandinavia, would have been kicked out in 24 hours. Here Brownell simply refuses to see the press and plans his next move.

Meanwhile there is new evidence that this is not a normal political battle but a war of extermination. If Democrats can't see that, they are blind. Brownell's sponsor, Governor Tom Dewey, in a speech at Hartford, Conn., told his GOP audience "whenever anybody mentions the word 'Truman' and 'Democrat' to you for the rest of your lives remember that those words are synonymous with Americans dying, thousands of miles from home, because they did not have the ammunition to defend themselves . . . the loss of 450 million Chinese . . . diplomatic failure, military failure, death and tragedy."

These are strange, incredible words, matching those of McCarthy and Brownell. They are conceivable only in the context of the times. A successful party would not need to employ them. More and more, the men around Ike act and speak like people lacking confidence in the constructive program which he advocates. Ike's own attitude is strangest of all; he seems to deplore, but then at the same time tolerates, such supporters.

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Noteworthy This Week

BEHIND THE HEADLINES

Korean Repeat?

THE COMMUNISTS obviously have decided that there shall be no Korean peace conference for a long time, if ever. Since the inflexibility of both sides on the major points under discussion would have provided ample opportunity—as would the peace conference itself—for prolonging negotiations, the Communists must want even more time than mere stalling would provide. They probably also want the freedom of action a breakdown in negotiations gives them. Their reasons might be found in the tendency of the democracies to bicker among themselves and to take ill-considered unilateral action whenever forced to play a waiting game. The Communists may well expect to profit from the eagerness of some free nations to increase their China trade and the determination of some US extremists to shape an inflexible policy toward such trade. And they may also see in President Eisenhower's decision to withdraw 35,000 American troops from Korea evidence that US domestic politics will make it profitable to retain complete freedom of action.

The Korean conflict seems to have entered its crucial, economic stage. The part of Korea which is first built up to a point where it can fully exploit its economic potential will sooner or later dominate the other. The Communists are making a major reconstruction effort in North Korea. But the UN is far ahead of them in South Korea. The Communists now will have to make a truly gigantic effort if they hope to surpass us. But the present economic situations in China and Russia cast considerable doubt upon Communist ability to make such an effort.

Yet, if our major concern in Korea now should be the building of economic strength, that in itself is not a reason for weakening our military strength there. The very fact that the Communists are at a disadvantage in the economic struggle would seem to require that they not be tempted to revert to force. The withdrawal of American troops as negotiations break down comes dangerously close to repeating the initial error for which the Republicans so roundly denounced the Democrats.

The Weakening Wave

IN THIS ISSUE, Leon Keyserling forecasts continued prosperity during 1954. Recent actions and decisions of the Eisenhower Administration indicate that it shares this view but looks no further.

The Administration is clearly willing to allow 1954 to be the *second* most prosperous year in our history. It is not worried about a severe business slump. If it were, the Treasury Department would not be insisting on postponement of a five-percent cut in corporate taxes scheduled for April 1. Such a cut would give lagging business a shot in the arm. The same optimism explains the Treasury's drive, in an election year, to put off wide-scale cuts in excise taxes. Similarly, the Federal Reserve Board has boosted the lending power of banks through an increase in their reserves of $1.7 billion. If a serious slump were contemplated, many times that amount of new credit would have been pumped in.

The Administration's attitude amounts to a decision to coast along on the weakening wave of past prosperity. Various officials insist that they are ready to step in with a public-works program, deficit spending on a broad scale and new aids to the jobless should a really serious down-turn shape up. But such reassurance is vitiated by the fact that rather than take the mild measures required to keep national production growing as our labor force expands, and thus forestall the need for more drastic action, the Administration is willing to accept a contemplated drop of $18 billion, five percent, in our gross national product during the coming year. Merely to maintain the 1953 level would be to lose ground. Allowing a decline will make it immeasurably harder to maintain and increase prosperity.

Let nothing you dismay

The End of Bonneville

IN AN ANNOUNCEMENT issued from the Arlington Club, citadel of big business in Oregon, Under-Secretary of the Interior Ralph Tudor declared that the Bonneville Power Administration would be stripped of its planning functions. The agency, he added, will now operate as a "wholesale utility company." No longer will it promote "regional power development."

Many residents of the Northwest regard Tudor's statement as a funeral oration for the part of the nation which has enjoyed a phenomenal 40-percent population increase since 1940.

When the Democrats took over the national government under FDR, only 30 percent of the Northwest's farms had electricity. The figure soared to 90 percent under the impact of Bonneville juice. Still more significant, the first low-cost Bonneville kilowatts became available in 1939. Between that time and 1947, industrial payrolls in the Northwest increased 329 percent as contrasted with a gain for the country as a whole of 284 percent. This was the only time in the history of the Northwest that its industrial employment has exceeded the national average.

But Tudor's boss, Secretary of the Interior Douglas McKay, ex-Governor of

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Oregon, let the last veil fall the next day. He said in Portland: "Bonneville wasn't planning regional development under the Democratic Administration. It was promoting public power. That is what is being stopped."

Utility corporations in the Northwest long have feared Bonneville's low rates and federally-owned transmission lines. If Bonneville can be reduced to a mere wholesale marketing agency, with no planning responsibilities, it is less likely to challenge the power companies. The next step may be the raising of Bonneville rates.

Five private companies in the Northwest have just announced that they intend to file claims to choice power sites along the Clearwater River. One of these proposed dams, that at Penny Cliffs, will flood out the magnificent Selway wilderness area, one of the finest fishing and recreational realms in North America.

In Good Hands

T. COLEMAN ANDREWS is US Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Joe McCarthy is the only US Senator whose amazing finances are exposed in an official Senate report. When the Justice Department dropped its investigation of McCarthy's finances, it announced that the possibility of tax violation was being probed by Andrews' department. On December 10, while his subordinates were presumably working on the case, Andrews drove down to Richmond, Va., with McCarthy. They stopped for a while at Andrews' home, then went on to a reception which Andrews had arranged. There, the nation's tax chief introduced McCarthy as "one of the great Americans of our time . . . soldier, patriot and statesman."

Who Killed Beria?

THE NEWS that Lavrenti Beria, former Soviet Deputy Premier, and six of his aides were executed as traitors on December 22 is certainly no surprise. But the manner of his trial and execution is remarkable. It may seem ironic to speak of legality in Soviet Russia, but the fact remains that Beria and his aides were illegally put to death.

The Soviet Constitution provides for a regular procedure for the crimes of sabotage, treachery, counter-revolutionary plotting and restoration of capitalism that were leveled against Beria. The USSR Supreme Court takes jurisdiction in these crimes and accordingly, on July 10, the Kremlin communique which announced Beria's arrest "as an enemy of the party and the state" revealed that his actions had been referred to the Supreme Court. The Prosecutor's Office further stated that the Supreme Court would try Beria "in accordance with the procedure laid down by the law of December 1, 1934."

Yet on December 22, in announcing that Beria and his aides had been shot, *Izvestia* revealed that they had been tried and sentenced not by the Supreme Court but by a Special Judicial Commission. The Chairman of this Commission was not a judge but a military leader, Marshal Ivan Konev; its other members included the head of the trade unions, M. M. Shvernik; a deputy chief of the secret police; a representative of the Communist Party and two representatives of Beria's own state of Georgia. Only one member of the Supreme Court sat on the Commission and only one other judge, brought in from the Moscow City Court. The Commission, in other words, was not a judicial body at all as the Soviet Constitution requires but a political front designed to emphasize and dramatize the political unity of the new regime.

The finding of the Commission adds nothing of significance to the original charges made at the time of Beria's arrest. Though it throws the standard volume at him, charging him with committing treason in 1919 and 1920 by conspiring secretly for the "counter-revolutionary Mussavat Government in Azerbaijan" and *also* for the Georgian Menshevik Government, both agents of the good old British Intelligence Service which serves as the traditional catch-all for foreign conspiracy. It seems improbable that these alleged actions of 30 years ago were the cause of the execution of Russia's second most powerful man. Nor is there any hint of crimes committed during Stalin's declining years. The main charges concern the months from March to June, 1953, suggesting that it was Beria's effort to remake the government following the death of Stalin that led to his arrest and execution. The Army seems to have gained more than any other group in the turmoil that has taken place since March, 1953. The secret police which Beria led has apparently declined in power.

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Published weekly and Copyrighted, 1953 in the USA by New Republic, Inc., publishing office, 301 N St., N.E., Washington 2, D.C. Editorial communications should be addressed to 1826 Jefferson Place, N.W., Washington 6, D.C. Business communications should be addressed to 230 West 41st St., New York 36, N.Y. Entered as second-class matter September 26, 1950 at the post office at Washington, D.C., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Single copy, 20c; Yearly subscription, $7.00; Foreign, $8.00

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A JOURNAL OF OPINION New Republic

Editorial: Atomic Somersault

THE UNITED STATES wishes to surrender its position as champion of world control of atomic energy? Very good; the Soviet Union is happy to assume our place, condemning the United States, as we once condemned it, for refusing to take the great steps that peace demands.

That (as the *New Republic* warned) is the principal result up to now of the President's new atomic plan.

The Kremlin is only too logical in rejecting the President's proposal:

It points out, accurately, that the President stressed the awful threat of nuclear weapons and then spoke as if they did not exist.

It complains, justifiably, that the proposal "in its essential points contains passages which are not clear."

It recognizes, properly, that among other ambiguities the proposal implies a silent abandonment of the UN Majority Plan for the control of atomic weapons.

It responds outwardly to this shift with concern rather than relief, holding rightly that the control of atomic weapons and not the development of atomic power is the overriding problem for all peoples, rich and poor.

So the Kremlin moves into the breach opened by the President's poorly prepared plan.

In the past the Kremlin has worked hard to create the illusion of peace while maintaining untouched its capacity to wage aggressive war.

Now it is the Kremlin which warns against illusory plans which "would serve to lessen the vigilance of the peoples regarding the problem of atomic weapons."

In the past the Kremlin has steadily blocked all limitations on its sovereignty in military matters.

Now it is the Kremlin which condemns the President's new plan because it "in no way ties the hands of governments" able to produce and use nuclear weapons.

In the past the Kremlin vigorously opposed world control of atomic energy as a capitalist plot to shackle the economic expansion of the socialist nations.

Now it is the Kremlin which rejects the President's plan to make atomic energy available for power on the sound assumption that the distribution of fissionable material would "not only fail to assist the reaching of an agreement on the banning of atomic weapons but, on the contrary, would be a new obstacle to the achievement of the above-mentioned agreement."

This is the Kremlin's reply. The restraint of its criticism can be judged when we realize that it was open to the Kremlin to reply instead with an indictment appalling in its gravity; that the President's plan diverts attention from atomic weapons to atomic power at the moment when the United States has decided to nail its flag in a future war to the very weapons whose inhuman destructiveness the President portrayed to the UN.

So the Kremlin completes the atomic somersault. This reversal of established positions was avoidable; it is regrettable; it can be, but need not be, catastrophic. An inspired President, leading an internationally minded party and a forward-moving nation might take advantage of the Kremlin's action, challenging the Soviet leaders to follow up, with specific proposals, the bold stand they have adopted as the leading advocate of effective world control of atomic energy. Can President Eisenhower act in these imaginative terms? He is as much the prisoner as the leader of a party trained to isolationism and a nation bred to fear. The need may be for Senate ratification of a treaty transferring sovereignty over atomic energy to a world authority. But the President's majority in the Senate is committed instead to the Bricker Amendment, which makes it impossible for Senators representing 90 percent of the American people to ratify any international agreement entered into by the President.

This point of course is not lost on the Kremlin. It has not advanced far beyond its established propaganda position in demanding "strict international control of nuclear weapons." But it has placed itself in a position where this propaganda demand might be taken up and pressed by the non-Communist nations.

II

That is the discouraging aspect of the events set in motion by the President's address to the United Nations. The hopeful aspect is that on the issue of nuclear weapons the Soviet Government has accepted the President's invitation to enter into private diplomatic talks. During eight years of public debate, noble speeches have invited harsh replies, rigid stances have been assumed and held according to the necessities of political warfare, information has been passed among heads of states by way of newspaper headlines and positions have been shaped to win the votes of the majority rather than the assent of nations most concerned. When, in the midst of this public battle, the State Department attempted to open private lines of communication, its notes were frequently published by the Kremlin, in distorted form. Most of the successful settlements that ended the postwar disput were initiated in secret; yet for every success there we hundred failures. If our allies were informed of by negotiations, then the negotiations were usually cu their premature publicity; if they were not informed th

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worst fears were aroused. For all these reasons communication has practically ceased between the governments of Russia and the West. At least one war, in Korea, has resulted from misunderstanding; and lack of communication alone has more than once delayed peace.

Now the Soviet Government has answered the President's speech in the spirit in which it was delivered. It asserts that "the Soviet Union is deeply convinced that mankind must and can be spared the horrors of an atomic war." It adds that "special responsibility for the solution of this problem rests with those states which already possess atomic weapons." It concedes that "nobody can deny the difficulties which lie in the way of solving this problem." It concludes: "However it can't be said that sufficient efforts have yet been made . . . by all the states particularly concerned to reach an international agreement. . . ." All this is constructive, and the Kremlin ends on a constructive note, by expressing its willingness to consider the President's plan further in private talks, if the United States in turn will consider its proposals for the prohibition and control of atomic weapons. This Secretary Dulles has agreed to do.

What chance is there then that these talks will succeed where all others have failed?

First on the agenda will be further discussion of the President's new plan. The Kremlin has stated flatly that it is irrelevant. It seems certain that it is also objectionable from the Kremlin's point of view.

The formal intent of the President's plan is to bring the benefits of atomic power to backward areas; this is certainly not a project which the Kremlin can undertake in concert with the nation it calls on peoples everywhere to spurn as the world's leading exploiter of the masses.

The central institution in the President's plan is an atomic pool, created by contributions from Russia and the West. Either the Kremlin must contribute as much as the US with its greatly superior resources; or it must acknowledge its inferior status. Both are unwelcome.

An important by-product of the President's plan, in the opinion of its authors, is that co-operation between American and Soviet scientists and engineers will provide us with information about Soviet atomic industry. The Kremlin is on guard against all such endeavors.

Secretary Dulles argues that the Kremlin, in attacking the President's plan, has missed its basic assumption—that beginning on modest prospects of co-operation we will progress to more difficult tasks. Our press dutifully echoes Mr. Dulles and scolds the Kremlin for being so dense. But surely this is foolish. The belief that by co-operating on good works we can set in motion a happy chain of events that will end in a limited world government with the Communists is a notion that has no place in the Soviet frame of reference. The Kremlin does not understand the point. It understands very well that are sentimental and naïve and it holds that these qualities are not proper determinants in the relationship of great nations with conflicting ideologies and national interests. If for these reasons the discussion on the President's plan does not end in agreement, then the United States government is bound in turn to consider the Soviet proposal for the enforced prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. This proposal, to be effective, must involve not only a ban on further production of nuclear weapons but an immediate or phased destruction of atomic stockpiles. There is a good deal to be said for this course if it is true that nuclear weapons sooner or later will place us at a disadvantage. For the present, however, these weapons are regarded as the principal safeguard the West possesses against Soviet aggression. They are said to redress the military imbalance created by Russia's superiority in ground forces. They are said to create the deterrent that makes the Soviet march across Western Europe unprofitable. To forswear under any circumstances the use of nuclear weapons would mean, in the view of our military planners, to forsake all hope of holding Europe at its Eastern frontiers. In fact, day by day, the Eisenhower Administration is cutting back on ground forces, emphasizing the role of the Strategic Air Force and relying more and more on atomic weapons.

Thus the private talks that are about to begin are called to consider two proposals—an American plan that is unacceptable to the Russians; a Russian plan that is unacceptable to the Americans. To enter negotiations on this basis is to deny the basic premise of diplomacy and to violate the sound rule the United States has followed of refusing to consider the details of plans that are unacceptable in principle. For this reason, if the talks are held to the accepted agenda, they are bound to fail.

Yet failure would be tragic; the opportunity may not come again. The President blundered in submitting a detailed and trivial plan. His blunder cannot be permitted to undo his gain in winning agreement on private discussions. These discussions can provide the invaluable meeting ground at which both sides can explain the fears that haunt them, the imperatives that bind them, the commitments from each other that they would find of value and the intrusions on their sovereignty that each is able to accept politically.

FROM THIS discussion we are convinced a realistic plan can emerge. It may be one that is progressive in its application and yet is addressed to the central problem; that does not prohibit at once the use of nuclear weapons, but foresees increasing restraints on their employment; that requires the minimum departure from existing national patterns and yet offers real safeguards; that finds security, not in the last twist on the last comma of an inspection agreement, but in the creation of a broad general situation in both countries far removed from one in which terrible blows can be struck without warning.

If, on the other hand the United States has already decided that the war of the future will be an atomic war, then this decision is the central assumption around which all realistic proposals must revolve. Under these circumstances the objective of common action becomes to prohibit, not atomic war but war itself.

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Good Times in '54, but . . .

The short-range outlook is bright, but the Administration should be looking far ahead

by Leon Keyserling

A DISTINGUISHED Australian economist, Mr. Colin Clark, has very recently added his voice to those who every few months since 1946 have been telling us that a real postwar depression in America is "just around the corner."

As I see the short-term economic outlook for 1954, it seems to me that in the over-all there are about two chances in 10 that 1954 as a whole will be a better business year than 1953, two chances in 10 that it will be about the same, five chances in 10 that it will not be as good as 1953 but quite good nevertheless, and only one chance in 10 that there will be a serious downturn.

The reasons why 1954 as a whole, despite some probable undulations downward for a short spell, should be a year of high prosperity in general are these:

1. The new National Administration readjusted its restrictive monetary policy rather sensitively as economic conditions commenced to change, and it is my belief, or at least my hope, that the American Government, regardless of party, will act sensitively and quickly on a broad front to help counteract adverse economic trends as they make themselves clearly manifest;

2. Incomes available for consumer spending are very high and are likely to grow in the aggregate, and retail trade is now quickening;

3. Many large businesses which condition the whole economy are planning large investment programs geared to the long-range growth potential of the United States and world markets, and some current estimates are that basic capital expenditures may be only four percent lower in 1954 than in 1953, while new construction is estimated as little as two percent lower;

4. Federal government outlays are not scheduled to decline precipitately in the near future, and the federal-state-local total may decline even less in view of the great backlog of need for local public improvements;

5. The bellwether industries, such as autos and steel, while not in as good shape just now as the economy at large, are likely to hold up better than was forecast by most of the gloomy people a few months ago.

6. The dynamic urge to make new and better products, to probe new markets, to improve productivity, and to reduce costs, is still present;

7. Liquid assets of all kinds are abundant;

8. Prudent confidence with regard to the future is more prevalent than a few months ago.

However, as against these strong favorable factors, there are other factors pulling in an unfavorable direction. Farm income and purchases have been running much lower this year than a year ago; the recent trend of industrial production has been downward although not yet seriously so; the purchasing power of weekly wages has declined slightly as the cost of living has risen; spot unemployment is inflicting real hardship in some places, as in the automobile and farm-equipment industries; housing starts for the second half of 1953 are down about 10 percent from the second half of 1952, although there has been a considerable upward movement in the most recent months; and the current estimate is that expenditures of the federal government for the fiscal year 1954 will be about $2.5 billion lower than for the fiscal year 1953. Most important of all, for the first time in several years, the total output of the economy has been leveling off instead of growing, and it is of the essential nature of our economy that it cannot remain stable by standing still.

Balancing the favorable factors against the unfavorable factors, there might be some justification for the extreme pessimism of Mr. Colin Clark and others, if one were looking merely at a page of statistics and neglecting the imponderable factors in the American economy which many times since World War II have confounded the extreme pessimists. The most important of these imponderables is that the future of our economy will not be determined by rigid mathematical derivations from the statistics of yesterday, but rather by the human actions which we take in response to the evolving problems of today and tomorrow.

Just as the main economic task of recent years has been not to step on the accelerator too fast, so the central task just ahead will be not to get frightened and jam on the brakes too fast. There will be some softening of some industries, and some rolling readjustments in some

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Leon Keyserling, now a consulting economist and attorney, was Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers from 1950 to 1953. His article is taken from an address to the Toy Manufacturers of the USA.

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sectors, but these should occur in an orderly fashion, and if they can be prevented from spreading outward to the economy at large, they can lay a sound foundation for a sustained and throbbing economic expansion on a healthy basis onward to 1960.

Barring a total war, the total annual product of the United States economy can rise in uniform dollars from an annual rate close to $375 billion recently to an annual rate close to $500 billion by 1960; the annual rate of consumer outlays can rise from the neighborhood of $230 billion to $325-330 billion by 1960, total private business investment can rise from an annual rate in the neighborhood of $57 billion to near $85 billion by 1960. With this range of expansion in these areas, the public outlays at all levels of government needed to help sustain full employment can be high enough to fulfill all of our essential national purposes and at the same time low enough to balance the budget with reduced taxes within a very few years because of the vast expansion in the income base from which taxes are collected.

The course that most individual business firms should follow in 1954 is clear. Since the over-all economic outlook is for reasonably high level general prosperity, the firm that is alert and well-managed need not fear disaster due to conditions beyond its control. In fact, it can do considerably better than the national average, and particularly in many consumer lines may have an even better year in 1954 than in 1953, if it becomes more efficient, does not look for a free ride, watches its inventories, and adjusts its prices and product policies to the ample markets which will be available if properly cultivated.

Success will depend more than before on hard and intelligent efforts, instead of being excessively easy to achieve. If a large enough number of individual businesses respond to this challenge, instead of surrendering to abject fears or to the depression mongers, the over-all economic results in 1954 may well be very close to 1953 and better than in any preceding year. But if any individual businesses fall into the trap of what Paul Hoffman has recently called the psycho-depression mood, they can lag behind the pack and be unprepared to share in the long-range economic growth of the country. More important, if too many individual businesses plan for a real depression, we will have one.

The policies of government are also of vital significance. The President has on several occasions expressed his belief in the need for and in our capacity to maintain a stable and growing economy, which means an economy of rising employment and production year by year. On the other hand, there are some men in high places who are unfortunately committed to the economic philosophy of periodic contractions or "readjustments" in the economy. An example of this latter view is a highly placed official who in a recent public statement said that the government should take vigorous and aggressive action to prevent a "spiraling recession," which he defined as an economic downturn of 25-30 percent, but should not take vigorous and aggressive action on a broad front in the event of a "readjustment," which he defined as an economic downturn of from five percent to 25 percent. If the philosophy of folding our hands and waiting until the hour is late should prevail, we could all be in for very serious trouble.

There is great need now for public assurance from the most responsible quarters that the government is specifically prepared to act now, and will act further as the need arises, to meet those economic problems which are already urgent, such as the farm problem and spot unemployment. There is need also for a rapidly expanding level of residential construction, supported by a comprehensive and well-rounded program including slum clearance and low-rent housing. The recently announced goal of a million houses a year is dangerously low; we built that many in 1925 and 40 percent more than that in 1950.

THE DRASTIC changes in monetary policy early this year produced some undesirable results, and generated a wide range of concern throughout the economy until this monetary policy was substantially modified. While this modification was a good sign of future intentions, there is still legitimate concern in many quarters that the government may pursue an unduly restrictive monetary and credit policy measured against the need of an expanding economy. The sooner this concern is set at rest, the better off we shall all be.

While a balanced budget is highly desirable, the American businessman knows as well as the American consumer that an effort to balance the budget by restrictive taxes or by excessive cutting of expenditures will be self-defeating, and that the main approach to a balanced budget must be through those fiscal policies which play their part in encouraging the dynamic growth of the economy. Even a five- or 10-percent decline in the American economy next year would add enormously to the unbalance of the Federal Budget; while if we maintain during the next few years an over-all rate of economic expansion clearly consistent with our technology and manpower growth, we shall find the fiscal affairs of government in the best shape that they can be in view of the burdens imposed upon us by the world situation. A full employment fiscal and monetary policy is in the long run clearly the best kind of fiscal and monetary policy. This is evidenced by the fact that the government had a net surplus in the cash budget during the years from 1946 through 1953, despite the great expansion of expenditures which became necessary after the Korean outbreak.

Above all, the current and foreseeable economic situation, when we are wondering whether we can use all of our productive power even with the present defense program or slip into a depression despite it, renders preposterous any notion that we must cut defense or international economic co-operation to save our economy. We most assuredly have the resources to assume whatever tasks may be indicated by the perils—or by the promise—of this atomic age.

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UNHAPPY FRANCE

Her Troubles in Europe and Asia Weaken the Free World—She Needs a New Deal

FRANCE IS very much in the minds of the free nations these days. Her heritage and her position make France the keystone in the West's defensive arch; her social and political system leave the entire arch in peril. As each new crisis breaks, and the miracle that has sustained France in past centuries fails to occur, the attitude of her allies alters from concern to disgust. In turn Frenchmen become as contemptuous of their allies as they are suspicious of each other.



After weeks of squalid maneuvering France has chosen a new President, Reni Coty, who takes office in a crisis comparable in difficulty and in gravity to those which Franklin D. Roosevelt faced when he entered the White House in 1933. They are comparable in another important respect as well. Though France's present problems are most evident to the outside world in the field of foreign policy and relations, the core of the trouble is at home. The nation's place in the world depends upon an immediate, courageous and thorough approach to the domestic difficulties with which the foreign problems are intimately and causally connected.

What France needs above all is an equivalent of the New Deal. For without it, a sound arrangement to live in peaceful co-operation if not in brotherly love with the Germans can not be made; France must be ready and able to compete with Germany on a basis of equity. And on such an arrangement all of France's foreign relations depend.

There is probably more—in quantity and quality—of the four freedoms—and of every other kind of freedom—in France than in any other country of the free world. But bitter memories of past servitudes and sacrifices tend to blind the French to the need to pay a high price in changed political habits and patterns for the right to keep free. The French are probably the least totalitarian people on earth. But individualism rooted in the experience of the pre-totalitarian past tends to block the formation of the psychological attitudes needed for the effective working of modern democracy. If statist totalitarianism is an unqualified evil, it is by no means good to reduce the state to the unfused and weak sum total of ever-changing parts.

One of the distorting factors in the otherwise understandable French concept of national security through specific guarantees—from the US and Britain, for example—is the fact at home of unhealthy security—of economic over-protection. As the report on the Economic Budget of the Nation points out: "The protection and rigidities of the French economy have lasted long enough to have permitted a basic deformation of French society." The equivalents of the US pressure groups and lobbies work directly from the benches of the National Assembly and the Council of the Republic; quite often, as a matter of fact, they *are* the government. Entrenched special interests—the so-called *féodalités*—gang up with one another to keep the power and profits they have, and to grab more, in a manner that would be inconceivable in Washington's big-business regime.

The Communists keep a strangle hold on labor, largely because the men and parties in power do the opposite of coming to the rescue. Despite misconceptions abroad, the psychological source of French neutralism isn't on the political Left. It lies in the existence, in comfortable though essentially false security, between the working masses and the feudalistic minorities of big bank, business, and industry, of a huge parasitic class of small storekeepers, farmers, marginal businessmen and industrialists. Such little Frenchmen, thinking that they can exist painlessly and irresponsibly in the economic middle at home, feel that France can do the same politically between the US and Russia. In reality, they live by the sufferance (and to fulfill the purposes) of the big Frenchmen on the Right. It is pleasanter to forget this fact, just as it is easy for the neutralists to forget that without US dollar help, the sufferance by which France still counts as relatively independent might have run out long ago.

There are in France about 1.4 million small storekeepers. That's about one to every 30 inhabitants—a higher proportion than in any other country. It's also an increase of some 300,000 since 1945, and twice that number since 1939. Yet most of them make a pretty good living—largely at the expense of the workers' standard of living and of a failure to attack the obsoles-

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cence of the economy of the whole French people. So do about 800,000 factories employing less than eight workers each. The number of small farmers, tilling tiny pieces of ground has increased steadily; the amount of the land under cultivation and of its total yield has decreased. Wages and salaries remain low; profits, savings, dividends, interests go up. Big business uses little business—and the little man in general—as a political buffer against Communism. But the absurd result in national economic terms alienates labor and stimulates Communism. The cycle, always vicious, has now become dangerous not only for France, but for Europe and the whole free world.

THE SIMPLE fact is that unless far-reaching, indeed revolutionary changes are made—and quickly—in the structure of French society, President Coty may well be forced to preside over the dissolution of the Fourth Republic. Time is running out. Decisions have to be taken on big foreign problems. On the other hand, the foreign countries most concerned in these decisions, the US in particular, could do better—with the French in their present situation and mood—than to use shock treatment as a palliative for their own impatience.

Of course, the French should speak on specific matters of general concern. If not EDC, then what are to be the form and timing of German rearmament? Is there to be real war in Indo-China, or honest negotiations? What is the practical military attitude toward the US New Look, based on nuclear weapons and bases? On the other hand, if the French voice has been confused or choked with anger of late, some of the fault lies outside France. The blithe disregard of French domestic problems, expressed in the timing of the Bermuda and Berlin conferences, was reflected in the passionate splits among the delegates at Versailles, which made the presidential election a harder and a longer process than any before in the history of republican France.

Certainly Paris was the wrong place, the NATO gathering of big military brass the wrong occasion and the eve of the election the wrong time for Secretary Dulles to put the problem of EDC ratification into the oversimplified context of a moralistic struggle between good and evil, a parallel of his expressed view of the Cold War itself. The US may have what Dulles called a spiritually based society. France hasn't—far from it. The problem of EDC ratification has many aspects, but none is moralistic or spiritual.

There are few democrats in Western Europe who believe (as Dulles suggested) that the French are insane in putting the EDC problem in the framework of good, long-term French relations with a dependably good (that is, non-aggressive and non-expansive) Germany. Tough talk to the French on this (or any subject) seldom does any good—certainly not from a man who had just reproved Senator McCarthy for wanting the US to use the *diktat* method. It did serious harm at a time when the French, tangled up in their own troubles, felt that they were being forced at pistol point into a mesalliance.

Thanks to the Dulles shock treatment (which General Eisenhower, good soldier that he is, found quite normal diplomacy), President Coty will have to deal with the EDC problem in the framework and atmosphere of the worst crisis in the relations between the French *people* and the US *Government* since the Liberation. This isn't to say that Dulles created the crisis. He didn't quite do that. He brought out into the open a situation which has gone steadily from bad to worse since Eisenhower first began to let his notoriously poor view of French moral fiber and high opinion of German soldierly virtues affect US policy. A series of French Governments have been equally to blame. Eager to please Washington, and thereby to keep the dollars coming, they have falsified the facts of French public and parliamentary opinion.

Dulles did however do his bit to make matters worse. He far overshot the clear, sober and honest warning that might have been psychologically useful. There's no longer much sense in Western Europe in talking of the "possibility" of German armament; everyone knows that the decisions to be taken are about its form and timing. Nor is there any profit in referring to the US military New Look as contingent on French ratification of the EDC. Certainly non-ratification was taken into account by Admiral Arthur W. Radford who in Washington, on the same day Dulles was speaking in Paris, made known that the New Look program for a "sturdy military posture" had already been planned and submitted for a period up to the end of June, 1957.

The least sane and sensible thing Dulles said to the French was that, "If they decide to commit suicide, they might have to commit it alone." Whatever the French do or don't do will inevitably affect not only themselves but all of Western Europe and the US too. No nation in Western Europe, France least of all, can drop out or be dropped out of alliance. Neither in fact, nor by any meaningful figure of speech, can a big chunk of Europe between the Rhine and the Radford Line be a military no-man's land. A German army can't exist safely with a vacuum in its rear. The Atlantic powers can't maintain lines of communication to the "Eastern front" through territory dominated by neutralism or resistantialism. The "suicide" of France would make it harder, not easier, for the US to take ground troops out of Europe.

"The suicide," as the *Manchester Guardian* says, "would be America's as much as Europe's." Unfortunately, such language as that of Dulles has for Western Europeans the overtones of a new kind of US isolationism. This is a serious matter in France. For it is a guarantee in reverse—a threat that the kind of New Deal which France urgently needs will get the opposite of help or even sympathy from Washington. If so, where are the French to turn? To Eisenhower's "good" Germans, or farther east and north to even less "good" Europeans, who have been showing themselves very, very eager to be turned to by the French? FRANK GORRELL

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Oh Evil—Colonial Rule

On July 3, the French offered to talk about granting greater independence to the three Associated States of Indo-China. As the date for the talks approaches, most Indo-Chinese see the offer as so much French dressing.

On the surface the French appear to be bowing out of their colonial outpost in Asia. But most Viet-Namese shrug their shoulders and say, "It will look good in the UN, and it will probably mean more American military aid to fight the Viet-Minh, but we will be ruled by the French as we have been these many years."

The July 3 Declaration was admittedly good propaganda, particularly since the French were under attack for their reluctance to budge on the Moroccan issue in the UN. A financial burden on France for seven years, the war against Ho Chi-minh's Communist forces could completely paralyze the French economy. Greater concessions to independence, it is reasoned, will mean more American aid.

In 1949 the French gave up Cochin China. This rich delta land was amalgamated with Tonkin and Annam to make up the territory of Viet-Nam. The Executive Convention of December, 1949, and the Inter-State Convention of November, 1950, implemented the independence of Viet-Nam, Cambodia and Laos, granting sovereign rights to the States on the national and international levels. The three States were to exercise complete autonomy, as members of the French Union. They were joined together in the French Customs Union. It looked good on paper.

In Viet-Nam, particularly, the French had ample time to select indigenous government leaders, including Bao Dai himself, who would not prove disloyal to France. Many of these Viet-Namese were given French citizenship. Bao Dai still retains more than a thousand square miles in central Annam and Tonkin as his personal property, his price for coming out of luxurious exile on the Cote d'Azure.

Viet-Nam's National Congress is generally regarded as pro-French. Its 200 members were chosen by administrative officials "to represent all planes of present political thought and all levels of interest." This Congress will elect 20 persons, from whom Bao Dai will personally select five to serve with the official delegation (which was hand-picked) at the Paris conference. As one Saigon journalist commented, "You can bet your last piastre that not one of those 'duly elected' five will raise a single objection to what the French dictate. They won't represent the true wishes of Viet-Nam."

Last fall's unanimous resolution by the Congress calling for independence outside the French Union encouraged most Nationalists. But the retreat from this stand, hastened by rapid maneuvering by Bao Dai, immediately afterwards, washed away hopes that the Congress as a whole would fight for equal status with the French.

Internal affairs are still under French control as was dramatically demonstrated when the 1953 devaluation of the Indo-Chinese piastre was performed unilaterally by Paris.

The Three Associated States are members of the French Union—"an association of free and equal peoples"—but France is not a member. Viet-Namese Nationalists would like to see France join the Union, not rule it. The three States may not leave the Union, and France has complete control over their economy through the Customs Union. Foreign relations are conducted "in harmony" with French policy. Because of the war, a most convenient pretext for continuing French control, the States exercise "parallel competencies" with France.

French censorship is thorough. Items which would put the French in a bad light are not printed. The primary responsibility of the press is to instill in the Viet-Namese a sense of participation in the war, a spirit the people lost many years ago.

The cry of Viet-Namese hasn't changed. "How is it possible for us to wage a war which will profit only France? If the French prove to us that they will pull out of Viet-Nam when the Communist threat is eliminated, we would look upon this war as *our* war. Believe us, if these assurances were forthcoming, the Viet-Minh would be crushed. But to fight for independence is to fight both the French and Ho Chi-minh."

The Viet-Namese agree that the French army is necessary. So is American military and economic aid. Independent Viet-Namese units, under the command of Viet-Namese with French advisory officers—in the manner of US-ROK Army relations in Korea—would satisfy the Viet-Namese. This would not only be a tremendous psychological shot in the arm to the army, but it would also train leaders for the future.

Viet-Namese capital is negligible by any standards. French holdings constitute the wealth of the country. People contend that unless the Viet-Namese are at least able to compete with the French businessmen, economic independence is impossible. Under heavy attack is the Bank of Indo-China, owned and operated by the French and purported to be the "master of the land."

The Bank of Indo-China controls exports and imports through its holdings. It is one of the greatest propaganda arguments the Communists possess. They spread information on how the bank squeezes agricultural and mineral products out of Viet-Nam and converts the nation's wealth into American dollars which never return to Viet-Nam. This view is held not only by the followers

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of Ho Chi-minh, but also by the millions pleading for a free, non-Communist state.

Viet-Namese industry never flourished. It never existed. Persons with knowledge of the Bank of Indo-China's power say it is more profitable to the French to concentrate on rice and rubber development without attempting to establish any kind of industry, however small. All of Indo-China's manufactured goods must be imported, practically all from France. Why should France compete with herself?

Viet-Namese Nationalists would like to see, at first, small industry developed, with Viet-Namese capital, for the benefit of Viet-Nam. But where the capital is to come from is a moot question. Many say the US is the only answer, but with French control, it is impossible.

The French are after military aid almost exclusively. While the need for pressing the war effort is not denied, critics point out that independent economic development is the greatest method of winning over those many non-Communist Nationalists who tend to think of Ho Chi-minh as better than the French. "Independent" is the key word. If there are any strings attached, Ho Chi-minh will continue to be the only champion of Nationalism. It is said that economic developments from the US, without France as the middle man and arbiter of where the aid should be applied, would be a great deterrent to the Red threat.

Rice and rubber are the sources of wealth in Indo-China. Rubber plantations, untouched by reforms and free of exorbitant taxes, are French properties.

The methods by which the French restrict the development of self-government are a major source of resentment. Educational facilities are limited; only one university is operated in Viet-Nam. Students have never been exposed to economics, political theory or philosophy to any appreciable extent. There are no facilities for training doctors, engineers or chemists. Selected students were dispatched to Paris for their higher education, but even in the land of *liberté, egalité, fraternité,* the Viet-Namese students pursued only those courses which wouldn't fill them with radical ideas.

Today's Viet-Namese student or official, anxious to take advantage of the many US scholarships, is officially or unofficially discouraged from doing so by the French authorities or their pro-French underlings.

Persons working for the government find that if they accept a grant from a US agency, they may receive no wages while in America. Their families may be moved out of their government quarters. The trainee may return to find that he has no job, particularly if he engages in any type of political talk on Indo-China while he is in the US. The arm of French security is long indeed.

How would Communism fare in the completely independent states? The French wax eloquent on theories that Ho Chi-minh would occupy the Palace of the High Commissioners in Saigon within a week after French power and influence were withdrawn. But they admit the futility of the "paddy war."

The Viet-Namese add: "Peace could be won easily, but the French will not let that happen. They impress you with the 'new fighting spirit' of General Navarre. So a few paratroopers land behind the lines, blow up some ammunition, and withdraw. It reads well in the American papers. That's all."

"We know," say the Viet-Namese, "that America is still for Europe first, else how could she bless the French policy here? The US handles France with kid gloves because of the European threat. Americans do themselves great harm by seeing things only in black and white. In China and Korea you see only the Communists on one hand and Chiang Kai-shek and Rhee on the other. Here it's Ho Chi-minh and the French-Bao Dai alliance. But extremists do not secure the future. It is the anti-French and anti-Communist group which is the majority here. Don't preach democracy to us. Help us win it!"

ROBERT WALTON

Robert Walton is an American journalist currently traveling through the Far East.

New Spectre—United Front

FRANCE'S deepening division, on the issue of the European Defense Community has enabled the French Communist Party to break out of the political isolation in which the country placed it over six years ago.

Maurice Thorez announced, soon after his return from Moscow, that the Communists would gladly work with all Frenchmen, regardless of political affiliation, who were opposed to the Treaties of Bonn and Paris. This offer of alliance has been informally accepted by a certain number of influential political figures. During the recent foreign-policy debates, for example, Communist cheers rang through the hall when Edouard Daladier (Radical Socialist and prime minister at the time of Munich) shouted at his Center colleagues: "To bring about the defeat of the European Army, I march with all men, whoever they are, with all parties, whatever they may be called." Another Center deputy apprehensively declared: "We cannot allow the Communists to enjoy a monopoly of patriotism"—implying that Communist policy is an expression of legitimate concern for the national interest. Others have even voiced approval of the Communist desire to reinvigorate the Franco-Soviet alliance in order to prevent West Germany from rearming. Nor does the

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obvious link between French Stalinism and Soviet Russia necessarily disgust nationalistic opponents of EDC. Maurice Duverger, a liberal commentator for *Le Monde,* indignantly commented: "How can we reproach the Communists for their dependence on the USSR, when dependence on the United States has prompted others to engage France in an adventure which will place her at the mercy of Germany? On the day when each chooses his protector, none of the protected has the right to criticize the others for their allegiance."

Opposition to the European Army has produced a truce and even a measure of weird co-operation between the CP and individual Gaullists. All over France public rallies protesting EDC have been dominated almost exclusively by Communists and Gaullists, who loudly proclaim that they accept each other's support in the common struggle against the "German danger." At a recent Paris meeting Louis Vallon (a Gaullist intellectual) hurried through his speech so that, as he deferentially explained, his "colleague," Jeanette Vermeersch (Maurice Thorez's wife and herself an important leader of what de Gaulle used to call the "separatists") would have ample time to be heard.

The "neutralist" Left has also been aroused by the prospect of working with the CP. A group of neutralists, sparked by Claude Bourdet, has actually circulated a proposal for a new Popular Front which would include the Communists but *not* be dominated by them. For many months *L'Observateur* (an influential neutralist weekly edited by Bourdet) has argued that a Left coalition without the Communists is impossible, but admitted that a Left coalition led by Communists would be risky. On October 29, *L'Observateur* published an exclusive interview with Maurice Thorez. Instead of denouncing "reactionaries, Social Fascists, and visionary neutralists" with his customary vigor, Thorez reaffirmed his willingness to act in common with all opponents of the EDC, and implied (at least so Bourdet believed) that the CP was prepared to support—without necessarily participating in—any Left coalition which would undertake a reversal of the French Government's pro-Atlantic policy. The following week, Bourdet seized upon this latter point, and proposed a clear-cut alliance between the CP, the Left, and even elements of the bourgoisie (as in 1936). However, he insisted that the goal of the new Rally of the Left is to defeat reaction, not to let the CP install a regime "far worse than the present one."

Other Left intellectuals are prepared to go even further. Under the impetus of the anti-Ridgway riots of 1952, Jean Paul Sartre produced a powerful polemic (consisting of a series of articles in *Les Temps Modernes,* a monthly which he edits) in favor of agreement between Communists and the Left on "precise and limited subjects, by reasoning from *my* principles and not *theirs.*" However, the difference between "my" principles and "theirs" was somewhat obscured when Sartre, in a poetic burst of pure Leninism, declared that the CP is *the* political organization of the proletariat. "If the workers lose confidence in the CP, they will disdain all politics, and they will disdain their class; the universe will be bourgeois. . . . If they rediscover their unity, it will be to rally around the CP; if they rediscover their combativity, it will be in order to obey its orders. . . ." While Sartre's blinding verbiage enthralled aesthetes and delighted Communists, the non-Communist Left was not comforted to learn that it was being prepared for slaughter.

To a large extent, the increasing collaboration between Communists and others represents a deliberate effort by the CP to implement its new "united front" tactic. In general, the international Communist movement has vacillated, since its inception, between two approaches in dealing with its rivals on the Left; the "united front from below," or pitiless criticism of reformist leaders and unity with their followers—on the assumption that Social Democracy and Liberalism constitute the major obstacle to Communist leadership over the masses; and the "united front from above," implying an alliance with the *leader* of Socialist and even bourgeois movements—but Communist militants are expected at all times to continue the incessant work of weakening their temporary allies (failure to do so constitutes "Right-Wing Opportunism").

From 1947 until 1952, the French CP waged war on the Socialist Party, attempting to demonstrate to Socialist supporters that their party was an "agent of French capitalism and American imperialism." But in the summer of 1952, after the failure of the anti-Ridgway riots, the CP found itself out on a limb. All those responsible for the manifestations confessed their "sectarianism"—that is, extremist actions—which had isolated the CP from the masses. The new policy became one of "anti-sectarianism" (but, at the same time, avoiding "opportunism") and a broadening out of the "peace" movement. Instead of castigating its rivals, the CP warmly wooed them. In France (as in the United States) Communists are now being urged to infiltrate "mass" organizations, work side-by-side with even avowed enemies, and gradually gain the confidence of other parties.

According to Karl Marx, when history repeats itself it appears the first time as tragedy and the second time as farce. While still reeling from the defeat of the May manifestations, the CP hinted that a revival of the Popular Front might benefit both the Communist *and* Socialist parties. The Socialists derisively pointed out that this was the second time around for the Popular Front, and dismissed the suggestion that the Communist Party deserved to be helped by its victims. The Communists have reverted to their standard "united front from below" tactic: they want unity with the followers, not the leaders of the SFIO, and they intend to accomplish this result by "unmasking" and violently attacking the Socialist chiefs. Under these circumstances, a Socialist-Communist accord is out of the question.

Nor is there much likelihood of a pact between the CP and the neutralists. The French Communists distrust

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Claude Bourdet primarily because he has had the audacity occasionally to criticize the USSR. When the French CP was proudly defending the arrest of the "medical terrorists" as a blow for world peace, Bourdet openly alluded to the anti-Semitic overtones of these proceedings, and even talked of the "bankruptcy of Stalinism." At that time the French CP labelled him "a declared enemy of the USSR and of the Communist Party."

On several occasions, leading Communists have referred sarcastically to the "petty bourgeois intellectuals" who want to form an independent Left capable of limiting action by the CP. One party spokesman was enraged by Bourdet's expressed desire to weaken Communist links with the Soviet Union, strengthening the non-Communist labor unions, and prevent the CP from staging a *coup*. Said Victor Joannès in *France Nouvelle* (weekly organ of the CP's Central Committee): "In other words, Bourdet wants the Communists to renounce their ideals, and abandon their ideological and political independence (*sic!*). He wants to cheat the working class of the right to realize its historic mission and to conduct, under the leadership of its Party, our country on the luminous road of Socialism and Communism. A thousand regrets, Claude Bourdet." The Communists have thus made it clear that unity can only be on *their* terms.

THE NASCENT right-wing Communist alliance is bound to be tenuous at best. The French CP is in favor of a unified pro-Communist and armed Germany, as proposed in the Soviet note of March, 1952. But most right-wing politicians, particularly the Gaullists, want to block the European Army in order to make possible collaboration between West German contingents and an intact "unintegrated" French Army—within the framework of the Atlantic Pact. During the recent Assembly debates enthusiastic applause rippled through the whole Chamber (Communists excepted) when Georges Bidault declared that, above all else, "Atlantic solidarity must be preserved and reinforced." Here is the crucial factor which limits Communists ability to negotiate alliances: the CP wants to defeat the European Army in order to bring about the domination of Europe by Soviet Russia, whereas the Right generally wants to maintain the independence of the French Army in order to bolster Western defenses. Each is trying to use the other for altogether different purposes.

"We are in 1788," M. Pierre Mendès-France has remarked, but he sacrificed truth to eloquence; the Republic is not the *Ancien Régime*. The parliamentary tradition is resilient enough to forestall armed revolt by the Communists, the "adventurism" of General de Gaulle, as well as the "senile Bonapartism" of Marshal Juin. However, the political system is not capable of producing a dynamic majority. In the succession of cabinet crises following the elections of 1951, Center politicians finally managed to ease the Socialist Party into opposition by attracting enough Gaullist supporters to form a government. With fairly solid support from three groups (Popular Republicans, Radical Socialists, and Independents and Peasants) and considerable support from RPF dissidents, it is now possible for the Center to maintain a conservative economic program over the unco-ordinated objections of Socialists, Communists, and that portion of the RPF delegation remaining faithful to General de Gaulle.

But this governing coalition is so constituted as to require an effort for it to achieve immobility. The static program of the Center-Right offers little hope for a revitalized, progressive France, with adequate housing, decent wages, fair taxes, and ample opportunity for the development of individual talents regardless of class origins. Thus, the existence of a powerful CP, by splitting the Left, has condemned France to an impasse; and the impasse of French politics has made it impossible to develop the kind of program which would reduce the CP to a band of fanatics.

However, like everything else in France, the CP is also in a deep rut. The French Communists cannot be voted into office when 75 percent of the electorate is violently anti-Stalinist; nor are they capable of seizing power—as was demonstrated by the dismal performance of Communist militants during the manifestations against General Ridgway. The CP can be certain of success only if Europe falls wholly within the sphere of influence of Soviet Russia. In Communist thinking, Russian armies have replaced the proletariat as the lever of "Revolution"; hence, abject subservience to Soviet diplomacy (even if it involves the rearming of a unified Germany and "anti-zionism") has become a humiliating necessity. "The party of Maurice Thorez," it has been proudly affirmed on numerous occasions, "is the party of *unconditional* attachment to the Soviet Union."

The French CP is thus concerned almost exclusively with foreign policy; domestic issues are exploited primarily in order to recruit cadres to be placed at the service of the international Communist movement. And the primary task assigned to the French CP is to facilitate the removal of the chief barrier to Russian hegemony over Western Europe by undermining the Atlantic policy of the French Government.

"Les Américains en Amérique (the Americans in America) is the understandable slogan of Communist militants; and others have shrewdly countered, *"L'URSS en Russie"* (the USSR in Russia)! Since there is little likelihood of either the Americans returning to America or the Soviets going back to Russia, the long-range prospect is for the French CP to remain in isolation, and in opposition. Unless challenged by a forceful government program of social and fiscal reform, the CP will be able to maintain its present strength relatively intact. But, at this juncture, only Russian bayonets can carry infallible Communism to victory in the land of Descartes.

BERNARD E. BROWN

Bernard E. Brown, formerly a member of the Department of Government at City College, is now observing political events in Europe.

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GERALD W. JOHNSON: *The Superficial Aspect*

I DON'T know what was the effect in the high world of politics and diplomacy, but down in Bolton Street among us small people I am sure that the pre-Christmas conferences at the White House brought a sense of relief and release. It was not the program adopted—we don't know yet what is in the program—it was the impression made that Eisenhower is assuming command. It could be a false impression, but unless and until it is proved false we prefer to accept it at its face value.

Five words constantly on the lips of Andrew Jackson tell more about the man than half the biographies. They explain why he was sometimes terribly wrong, why he was bitterly hated, but also—in large measure—why he was great. The words were, "I will take the responsibility."

In Washington that phrase may be, and usually is, regarded as the challenge of a dictator, but not in my neighborhood. We are not magnificoes with lofty political philosophies and soaring political ambitions; we are small people, honest, patriotic and perfectly sane, but not intellectual giants, Heaven knows, and we are living in a world that has Einstein baffled and dismayed. The best we can do is seek a leader who seems intelligent and who is willing to be held accountable for his acts.

So when a man comes along saying, "I will take the responsibility" we give at least a respectful hearing to any proposition that he may advance; and if his proposition is even half rational we are capable of giving him the tremendous loyalty that our forefathers gave Old Hickory. That was what we expected of Eisenhower last November. It seemed to us that a man who could order the Normandy invasion with a resolution that could not be broken by the weather, the Germans and Churchill all combined, could be expected to take over the Presidency as resolutely.

But his first 11 months were disappointing. It may have been only a superficial aspect, but Eisenhower seemed to be consistently and persistently ducking responsibility. Things got so bad, indeed, that Clement Attlee, the former Prime Minister of Great Britain, said publicly that he didn't know whether Eisenhower or McCarthy was the dominant influence in Washington. Certainly nobody intended to make McCarthy President, but he was clearly ready to take the responsibility, and if no one else would, why. . . .

So when Eisenhower called the conferences, when Eisenhower presided, and when Eisenhower summarized the work at the end of each day, hope revived. Perhaps nothing was wrong except that the man, realizing his political inexperience, had actually believed all that campaign balderdash about the menace of dictatorship, and had determined to avoid even the appearance of that evil. In that case, there was little to fear, for events would teach him.

The danger was—and is—that Eisenhower may be under the spell of outmoded authorities to such an extent that he regards the ideas of Nelson W. Aldrich as constituting political wisdom. He is under no such illusion as regards foreign affairs; he has had too long and too intimate an acquaintance with what is going on in Europe to think of foreign policy in terms of 1898. Possibly 11 months in the White House have been modernizing his views of domestic policy as effectively. At least we are permitted to hope.

Nevertheless, a doubt lingers. Eisenhower at least is preparing to send a program to Congress. That is splendid. But at the conferences Martin, Knowland, McCarthy and Velde were present and presumably took part in shaping the program, so when it finally emerges from the obscurity that envelops it now, whose program is it going to be?

That is the critical question, for while we like a man who will take the responsibility, we do not dismiss the matter from our minds; we hold him very strictly to that responsibility. There is the difference between Andrew Jackson and a dictator; it is true that Old Hickory's personal power was comparable to that of Hitler, but only as long as he satisfied the people. Remember that Franklin D. Roosevelt could throw armies across half the world, and spend billions on projects never heard of before, but this well-nigh absolute monarch at the height of his power suffered a smashing defeat when he undertook to change the date of Thanksgiving.

If Eisenhower will take the responsibility the people will give him such support that he can knock all his opponents off the board with one back-handed sweep. But he will not become a dictator, for there is always what Wilson called "a gun behind the door" in an independent electorate that wants a leader to lead, but will not suffer him to run away.

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LITERATURE AND THE ARTS

AMERICAN POETRY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

by Arthur Mizener

THE POETRY of any age is distinguishable—if it is—by the constellation of attitudes and ideas which constitutes its particular sensibility and by the rhetoric with which it defines this sensibility. It is always dangerous to discuss the poetry of an age. Poems, if not always written by fools like the gentlemen who said they were, are written by men whose art it is to be particular.

The most remarkable characteristic of American poetry in the twentieth century is a wry, depreciatory honesty. Ezra Pound described its style in a sentence which illustrates the style well. "Poetry," he said, "ought to be at least as well written as prose." Perhaps only in the poetry of Hart Crane, with its romantic rhetoric ("The sea's green crying towers a-sway, Beyond/And Kingdoms/naked in the/trembling heart—"), and of Wallace Stevens, with its rhetoric of elegance ("Soon with a noise like tambourines./Came her attendant Byzantines"), is this attitude a minor element.

The shift to it begins with Robert Frost. Professional New Englander though Frost is, however, he was first recognized in England. T. S. Eliot, though much influenced by The Big River and Cape Ann, is as much a British as an American poet. Contrariwise, Auden, who is Yorkshire enough, is also the bard of Forty-Second Street. These examples are not meant to suggest that American and British poetry cannot be distinguished; there are clearly American qualities in all American poetry, from Pound's mock yawp to Eliot's English accent. But though many of these distinguishing characteristics are far from superficial, the profound qualities of our poetry are common to American and British poetry and, except for convenience, it would be foolish to treat them separately.

The characteristic depreciatory honesty of the age is very striking in Frost. He makes his most serious assertions in a homely, conversational manner, as if he felt he could authenticate his insights only by making the minimum claims for them, and none for himself. The laconic, country-bred New Englander who speaks in almost all his poems provides the anticlimaxes which are characteristic of his best poems, such as "The Most of It," where the speaker cried out that life wanted "not its own love back in copy speech/But counter-love, original response"; and then a great buck swam across the lake,

> Pushing the crumpled water up ahead,
> And landed like a waterfall,
> And stumbled through the rocks with horny tread,
> And forced the underbrush—and that was all.

This same attitude comes out in the very American poetry of William Carlos Williams and Pound, showing itself in the homeliness of their subjects and in the slight touch of comic exaggeration in their manner, as in Williams' directions for a funeral:

> For heaven's sake though see to the driver! . . .
> up there unceremoniously
> dragging our friend out to his own dignity!
> Bring him down—bring him down!
> Low and inconspicuous! I'd not have him ride
> on the wagon at all—damn him—
> the undertaker's understrapper!

In a quite different way it is the unwobbling pivot which steadies Pound's most serious passages, in which

> we have heard the fauns chiding Proteus
> in the smell of hay under the olive-trees,
> And the frogs singing against the fauns in the half-light.

In such passages Pound's verse is as lovely as any in the twentieth century, but its grave and responsible eloquence comes from a cool precision rather than an extravagance of rhetoric.

But much the most influential of the early poets of the age has been T. S. Eliot, despite his rather forbidding intellectual-puritan temper. ("How unpleasant," he once wrote himself, "to meet Mr. Eliot:/With his features of clerical cut,/And his brow so grim/and his mouth so prim. . . . ") The source of Mr. Eliot's influence is his awareness of our profound sense of inadequacy and his ironic self-possession in the face of this knowledge. If, after such knowledge, there is no forgiveness, still, nothing is to be gained by ignoring it or giving way to hysteria. From Prufrock, obsessed by the absurdity of his heart, anxious not forget that he is Osric rather than Hamlet, sure that he has no right to make a tragedy of his inability to hear mermaids singing, to the graver, less youthfully self-conscious voice of the age's greatest poem, *Four Quartets*, Mr. Eliot has known how to speak to that part of our nature we do not even know we have which underlies our opinions and even our beliefs. That special power is evident in the simplest phrases of the *Quartets*:

> I do not know much about gods; but I think that the river
> Is a strong brown god. . . .
> Home is where one starts from. As we grow older
> The world becomes stranger. . . .

Each in his own way, the poets who succeeded this first group have shown a similar attitude. The profoundly strange and original poetry of Allen Tate, for example, is full of it:

> This is the day His hour of life draws near,
> Let me get ready from head to foot for it
> Most handily with eyes to pick this year
> For small feed to reward a feathered wit.

It is in the nicely shaded control of feeling in John Ransom's poetry:

> There was such speed in her little body,
> And such lightness in her footfall,
> It is no wonder her brown study
> Astonishes us all.

It is in the deeply serious, wry primness of Marianne Moore, with whom New England is not a dramatic pose but a passion of the mind:

> 'No water so still as the dead fountains of Versailles'. No swan
> with swart blind look askance
> and gondeliering legs, so fine as the chintz-china one with fawn-brown eyes and toothed gold
> collar on to show whose bird it was.

The middle generation of twentieth-century poets was not so fortunate as the

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first. Whatever may have been the ultimate causes of its difficulties, it suffered from the widespread attempt to imitate Yeats *Persona,* which ill fits the boy from Providence or Kansas City; and, as Randall Jarrell has remarked, the influence of the late Dylan Thomas came close to corrupting a whole generation (it is still at work in so good a poet as James Merrill). In any event, only a few poets stand out in this generation: Mr. Jarrell himself, Robert Lowell, Delmore Schwartz.

Of these the most gifted and the most troubled is Mr. Lowell, who has recently been struggling to escape from the excessive metaphysical complication of his own thought into some kind of direct, narrative poetry, perhaps like Frost's, as if, after the range of metaphor in *Lord Weary's Castle*, he found this the best way to his meaning. Occasionally his gift comes clear, as in the beautiful "Falling Asleep over the Aeneid," and then he is the best poet of his age in America. A similar development, this time in a modification of Auden's influence, is at work in Mr. Jarrell's latest work, for example, in "Money." "Money" is ironic about the rich man who speaks it, but it is also ironic about the easy way we are all ironic about such people. "*I*'d talk down money if I hadn't any," the old man says.

But in a way the most interesting of these poets is Delmore Schwartz, in whose work the period style was first firmly established. Its harmonious blending of effects from such different poets as Pound, Eliot, Yeats and Auden—to name only the predominant influences—is a very considerable achievement. It allows Mr. Schwartz to create his own voice within the range of a familiar voice, as did the best of the Elizabethan sonneteers and of the eighteenth-century couplet writers:

> Let these romantic critics go elsewhere,
> *Elsewhere pretend that happiness is not like this.*
> Do we not have, in fine, depression and war
> Certain each generation? Who would want more?
> O what unsated heart would ask for more?

This style, at once conventional and personal, is widely possessed in the latest generation of poets. It is elegantly practiced by Richard Wilbur, whose Tom Swift

> worked at none but wit's expense
> Putting dirigibles together
> Out in the yard in quiet weather,
> Whistling beyond Tom Sawyer's fence.

It is funny and a little frightening in Reed Whittemore's Paul Revere:

> Is it one if by land, two if by sea?
> Or two if by land? Or what?

The great virtue of an established, period style of this kind is that it makes for a very high level of general performance. If the latest generation of twentieth century American poets has produced no poets-as-heroes, as did the first generation, it has produced a surprisingly large number of good poems by a surprisingly large number of writers, as any reader can see who will look through the excellent volume of *New Poems* by American Poets recently edited by Rolfe Humphries.

LAW FOR THE IMMIGRANT

EVERY democratic society entrusts to the most despised human beings in its midst the high responsibility of protecting the human rights of all its members. For when those who are rich, powerful, and respected receive considerate and humane treatment from agencies of government, this carries no assurance that similar treatment will be extended to less fortunate members of society. But when basic rights are available to kidnapers, subversives, and aliens just because they are human, then all the rest of us can take comfort in the assurance that our human rights will also be respected. As the great Kantian philosopher of modern German, Herman Cohen, in commenting on the Mosaic ideal that we "love the stranger" (Leviticus 19:33-34) and "have one law alike for the stranger and the homeborn," (Leviticus 24:22), observed, "The alien was to be protected not because he was a member of one's family, clan, religious community; but because he was a human being. In the alien, therefore, man discovered the idea of humanity."

CIVIL RIGHTS IN IMMIGRATION, by Milton R. Konvitz (Cornell; $3.50).

The lawyer or publicist who defends the rights of kidnapers, subversives, and aliens, is bound to attract to his own shoulders a good share of the hatred which society directs at his unpopular clients. It therefore takes a special sort of courage and an extraordinary devotion to the cause of democracy to produce such a work as Milton Konvitz has given us in this volume which is an excellent timely summary of recent developments in our law of immigration and naturalization. It is equally important as an analysis of the bureaucratic oppressions that threaten all of us, native-born as well as immigrant, in a society ruled increasingly by fear. For history shows that techniques of tyranny and oppression are generally tried out and perfected in application to some small and friendless group before they are extended to the rest of society. In the current decade it is the alien who is the subject of these evil experiments, as in earlier decades it was the Indian, the Negro, the Mormon, or the Chinese laborer.

Of the recent developments in American law governing immigration, deportation, and citizenship, Professor Konvitz calls particular attention to nine significant violations of human rights which are either introduced or intensified in the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952: (1) The injection of a special ancestry qualification to control the immigration of Europeans, Canadians, or Latin-Americans who may have "Asia-Pacific" ancestors. (2) The new discriminations which have just been set up to limit immigration from colonial areas and especially from the West Indies. (3) The perpetuation and rigorization of the national origins quota system. (4) The elimination of professors from quota-exempt categories—part of developing distrust of reason and intelligence. (5) The denial of ordinary rights of notice, hearing, and review in exclusion and deportation cases. (6) The elimination of statutes of limitation in deportation cases. (7) The use of deportation as a punishment for offenses not connected with immigration. (8) The use of denaturalization procedures to subject naturalized citizens to such deportation. (9) The self-defeating definition of subversive classes resulting in the exclusion of valuable allies in the cold war against Communism.

Perhaps the most important point at which Professor Konvitz goes beyond the recommendations of President Truman's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization has to do with notice, hearing, and review in deportation and exclusion cases. In the final analysis, all the injustices we have perpetuated against immigrants with the blessing of the Supreme Court rest on two legal factors: first, that immigration is simply

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a matter between the Federal Government and foreigners in which foreigners have no rights against the Government, and second, that deportation is not punishment. Professor Konvitz sees clearly what the President's Commission did not see, that immigration affects Americans as well as foreigners, and that the only solid legal basis upon which a regime of law can take the place of administrative absolutism in exclusion as well as deportation cases is by recognizing that an American citizen sponsoring the admission of a wife, parent, business associate, professional colleague, or assistant, and willing to undertake the responsibilities that may properly be attached to such sponsorship, should have the same elementary rights, with respect to notice, hearing, and judicial review, that would be available if the object of his concern were livestock or machinery rather than a living human being.

Presidential commissions on civil rights are notoriously more inclined to blame Congress than they are to blame the Executive when civil rights are ignored in practice, even though the fact remains that most of the important violations of civil liberties under recent liberal administrations have been attributable more to Executive rather than to Congressional decisions. That fact not only illuminates the difference between the approach of the Truman Commission and that of Professor Konvitz to the problem of procedural protections, but also gives a special significance to the many points on which Professor Konvitz—who cannot be accused of bureaucratic bias—agrees with the recommendations of the Truman Commission.

At only one point does Professor Konvitz's volume fail to offer what a reader familiar with the author's magnificent intellectual equipment might expect of this work. What is called for at this critical stage in our legal and political development is an objective analysis of the consequences that have followed from varying practices in various places and periods in American and world history. There is much reason to believe that such a study would demonstrate that while intolerance may not have much enduring effect upon the victims of discrimination it has regularly narrowed the economic opportunities, and international influence of those states or localities that practiced such discrimination.

Certainly it would add much to our practical understanding of the consequences of rival immigration policies if Professor Konvitz had attempted to calculate, for example, the cost in blood and substance of our anti-Japanese laws. Cold analysis of the high cost of prejudice may not carry the high emotional flavor of prophetic utterance, but in the long run may enlist the attention of many practical Americans, in and out of Congress, who are accustomed to hate at sight any political precept that seems to be based on considerations of ethics or humanity.

FELIX COHEN

THE SOUTH IN FACT

THIS BOOK is an abundant and useful collection of essays on Southern culture and individual Southern writers by twenty-six critics most of whom are themselves Southerners. If the problematical title means, as it seems to, only that Faulkner, Thomas Wolfe, Robert Penn Warren, Allen Tate, John Crowe Ransom, Caroline Gordon, Katherine Anne Porter, Ellen Glasgow, Eudora Welty, Stark Young and others are a remarkably interesting group of writers and that they are all in one way or another distinctively "Southern," then we need have no quarrel with the intentions of the editors. We need not suppose them to be either messianic or provincial.

SOUTHERN RENASCENCE: *The Literature of the Modern South*, edited by Louis D. Rubin, Jr., and Robert D. Jacobs (Johns Hopkins; $5).

Inevitably there are disagreements among the contributors as to just how coherent and self-contained a culture the South is or was. One cannot accept the idea of Ray West Jr., that in the stories of Faulkner "the timeless world of eternal values of the Southern past is posted [posited?] against the fluid and pragmatic present." It is impossible to square this with the agonized and incoherent Southern past Faulkner actually describes in his fictions. One steps out into the light, however, with Richmond Beatty, who tells us that "the South is a jungle, as is every other articulate region that has individuals willing to study themselves in terms of their way of thinking about life." And one is ready provisionally to accept Robert Heilman's formulation of "the Southern temper" as marked "by the coincidence of a sense of the concrete, a sense of the elemental, a sense of the ornamental, a sense of the representative, and a sense of totality" partly because he adds that "the Southern temper is not the temper of all Southerners."

Actually, most of the contributors take this skeptical line, and Andrew Nelson Lytle's wry bit of unreconstructed Agrarian poetry, a short essay called "How Many Miles to Babylon," is the only contribution in which Calhoun is still besting Webster and the industrial Northern Babylon is being valiantly opposed by the New Israel of the South.

The essays in *Southern Renascence* are best when they matter-of-factly investigate a particular literary theme or author, as in Walter Sullivan's "Southern Novelists and the Civil War," Irene Edmonds' "Faulkner and the Black Shadow," Harry Campbell's "Warren as Philosopher in *World Enough and Time*," or Vivienne Koch's "The Conservatism of Caroline Gordon." These essays and others like them tell us what we want to know; they tell us, that is, what the Southern writers mean and are. The important truth these essays demonstrate is that Southern culture now presents us with a considerable literary reality, to be judged as any literature is judged and not as the expression of a picturesque historical neurosis with its accompanying Confederate or Agrarian polemic.

RICHARD CHASE

THE TEA-SHOP AURA

WHAT is translation? "The . . . clairvoyant absorption of another world is presupposed; the English poet must absorb the ambience of the [original] text into his blood before he can render it with authority; and when he has done that, what he writes is a poem of his own following the contours of the poem before him." So Mr. Kenner; and I should agree with him if he were to call this process "reinterpretation" rather than "translation." But let us assume that he is right, and apply his dictum to these poems. A few stand, notably the superb *Seafarer* and (at least in the choral passages) the *Noh Plays*. More of them wobble: the Cavalcanti poems, for ex-

THE TRANSLATIONS OF EZRA POUND, with an introduction by Hugh Kenner (New Directions: $6)

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ample. And some simply collapse—almost the entirety of the translations from Arnaut Daniel. The reason for the successes is clear enough: Pound has indeed made "a poem of his own" in a language of his own. When he fails, he fails because he has chosen to invent a no-language, a bric-à-brac archaizing language, largely (in spite of his excellent ear) unsayable, and all but unreadable.

I am no more concerned than is Mr. Kenner with fidelity to the text: Pound's howlers are well enough known, but they have little bearing upon his poetry as poetry. I am bothered by the tea-shoppé aura. To cite a by no means extreme example: "When I see leaf, and flower and fruit/Come forth upon lynd and bough,/And hear the frogs in rillet bruit,/And birds quhitter in forest now, /Love inkerlie doth leaf and flower and bear,/And trick my night from me, and stealing waste it,/Whilst other wight in rest and sleep sojourneth." That is "from" Arnaut Daniel: *Lanquan vei fueill' a flor e frug*; but I submit that it needs translation itself—especially "Love inkerlie doth leaf and flower and bear." (Those, Reader, are verbs, not nouns.) True, Daniel wrote hundreds of years ago, and in Provençal. But he was writing a living language, not something dragged out of the remoter reaches of Skeat's Etymological Dictionary. He said *autra gens,* which is "other men," not "other wight"; he said *el bosc l'auzel,* not "birds quhitter in forest"; and so on. Pound here is catching the sense at two removes and transforming it into unintelligibility—musical unintelligibility, of course, but unintelligibility all the same. He may have "absorb[ed] the ambience," but he has not written a "poem of his own"; he has simply not written a poem.

Is it odd that a poet to whom almost all of us have gone to school should seem so school-boy in poems by which he obviously wants to be remembered? I think not. These translations are all very young; and Pound himself recommended translation as a salutary exercise for young poets insecure in their style. We may look upon *The Seafarer*, certain poems in *Cathay*, and the *Noh Plays* as happy accidents; there is nothing accidental about the First Canto (*not* a translation, whatever Mr. Kenner may say), or *Homage to Sextus Propertius*, or the almost numberless passages in the *Cantos* where Pound is remembering, not translating; or, if translating, translating from an unwritten original. (The epigram is Robert Hillyer's, though in a non-Poundian context, and Mr. Hillyer will understandably resent my appropriating it here.) From one point of view, it may have been a disservice to a great poet and teacher to summon these translations from a limbo where most of them should respectably be; from another point of view, we must be grateful for entertainment, education *per inversionem*, and, in rare but precious instances, awe.

DUDLEY FITTS

A BURIED LIFE

GEORGE MEREDITH seems to be lodged today in that unhappy purgatory of authors where there is neither damnation nor praise—although either would be at least a sign that he was being read. Who reads him? A novel or two, perhaps *Feverel* or *The Egoist,* are prescribed in the colleges; occasionally someone will quote a few lines from *Modern Love.*

THE ORDEAL OF GEORGE MEREDITH by Lionel Stevenson (Scribners: $6).

Now and again a critic mentions him in a perfunctory acknowledgment or grudging tribute to his historical importance. The best that E. M. Forster can say for him in *Aspects of the Novel* is that he was "the finest contriver that English fiction has ever produced."

And yet a novelist as sensitive (and as different from Meredith) as Virginia Woolf confided to her diary that she found him "so rich, so knotted, so alive and muscular." Perhaps this is understandable in one who achieved a fusion between poetry and fiction. In Meredith the fine poet never quite melted into the novelist; and in our own age, which is the great age of the novel, Meredith's artistic lapses seem greater than they did at the turn of the century. Also, I suppose, knotted muscularity is hardly to the taste of an era inured to Proust and to James.

One would like to say of Lionel Stevenson's biography of the novelist—the first, I believe, to be written on this side of the water—that it was indeed an act of devotion to write a life of one so neglected, to write it in the teeth of such indifference. But the strange thing is that the book shows neither devotion nor any particular feeling on the part of the biographer for his subject. He has been patient, and scholarly; he has searched for new material; he has settled this, that and the other little detail, but the net effect is chilling, and this seems inexcusable where the figure treated is one of considerable warm-bloodedness and, to repeat Mrs. Woolf's words, "so rich . . . so alive."

Now coldness and dispassion are admirable in a biographer while he is assaying the ore that he has mined. But then the transmuting process must begin. Mr. Stevenson's recital of the facts of Meredith's life reads like an encyclopedia article. One is never made to feel that the biographer considers Meredith's literary encounters or the daily incidents of his life any more important than the sharp ache of his first marriage that gave us *Modern Love.* And the second marriage is described as if it were a routine item in any of Meredith's long succession of days.

The result is that we have no "ordeal" as the biographer seeks to suggest in his title, borrowed from Meredith's most celebrated novel. We have only this chronological enumeration of a career that on the surface seems to have had the usual ups and downs of a man trying to live by his pen. The account of the works occasionally opens a fascinating vista into the life; but it is always only a glimpse, and we pass on to more incidents and anecdotes. What emerges accordingly is a pale, papery shadow of a major artist from whose lines a biographer might have sought guidance:

> In tragic life, God wot,
> No villain need be! Passion spins the plot:
> We are betrayed by what is false within.

Passion did spin the plot for Meredith and there was betrayal within. But the buried life remains to be explored.

LEON EDEL

ROMANTICIZED REALISM

LISBON in the 1860s is the scene of this story, and the soporific charm of the city, described unobtrusively in snatches and details, affects the characters in all their moods and actions. People who have known each other from childhood gather together to give recitations and literary appreciations, play the piano and sing songs. But this diminished world, dying of boredom, is also full of nervous energy.

COUSIN BAZILIO, by Eça de Queiroz (Noonday; $4).

A romantic young wife commits adultery and is blackmailed by a vicious old

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servant; when not able to extort money from her mistress, the maid extorts luxuries, and even work, until finally their positions are reversed. Luiza, the little bourgeoise become "piquante" to her cousin Bazilio, getting perpetually dressed and undressed for him, is also obliged to empty the garbage in secret. The irony of this intrigue is neatly plotted.

Eça de Queiroz worked in the nineteenth century school of French realism, but in *Cousin Bazilio* realism is used as a foil for an Iberian kind of poetic romanticism. As such it becomes exaggerated. The dialogue is clipped, violent and direct, and characters have the same violence, tending towards farce. The hideous old servant, who prides herself on her virginity and her small feet, the moustached, Europeanized cousin, who despises Lisbon and Luiza for their provincialness, the love-sick old lady, and the bombastic Councilor who gather in Luiza's drawing-room interfere with her love, and bob around her death-bed of remorse just as comic dancers gesticulate around a ballerina.

The Portuguese combination of romantic and comic attitudes is well brought out in Roy Campbell's highly readable translation. The love-plot, conventionally clichéd, also has an urgency not found in modern novels. But the nostalgic affection of the author for his native town is what gives the book its charm.

MARY HIVNOR

PRIMITIVE PEOPLES

LIKE any successful anthology, this book can be read in several ways. The professional anthropologist will find in it many echoes of change and debate within his field. Most of the rest of us will find it a grand new version of the travel anthology. They are great lookers and listeners, these travellers from Herodotus to Freuchen who appear in these pages. Their gift is that of a judgment suspended not because they have so little knowledge to balance, but because they have so much. This suggests a third way to read the book. The authors have provided in their introductory statement what amounts to an intellectual history of modern anthropology.

PRIMITIVE HERITAGE, by Margaret Mead and Nicholas Calas (Random House; $5).

Evolutionary models, unitary concepts and observational strategies stand as the livest of issues in the rich harvest of special publications now being yielded by Miss Mead's prodigious experience in her field. It is characteristic of her aim for communication that she should also have worked with Mr. Calas to produce this work for the more general reader. It consists largely of the reports of Europeans and Americans of their direct observations of primitives in the years between the Conquest of Mexico and today.

It gracefully includes literary men such as Melville and Gide as well as specialists in the study of culture. The appearance of these two guilds, side by side, reflects credit on the artists for their precision and on the anthropologists for their stylistic gifts.

Since the collection emphasizes the observation of primitives who have survived into our own cultural epoch, it invites us to consider our own culture as an historical transformation of a way of life that was once something like theirs. As these anthologists so carefully point out by their selections from Rousseau, Engels, and others, this has been a standing invitation to Western thought since the Enlightenment. In this volume, however, the invitation is not prejudiced by an assumption that what the primitive does is more "basic" than what we do, or that the way he does it is more simple than the way we do it. And whether or not this thought of ours proves to be a boon to the primitive in his future contacts with us, it certainly is a boon to our sense of ourselves, today.

REUEL DENNEY

END AS A YES MAN

by Eric Bentley

THE HUMAN RACE—it is the theme of Freud's *Civilization and its Discontents*—pays a high price for its institutions and organizations. This is one of the traditional themes of comedy and, since the industrial revolution, has almost become the main theme of all literature and drama. The artist being, *per se*, a champion of the human, the modern artist has most typically been the enemy of the institution. And, when he has lacked the genius to write a *Resurrection* or a *Saint Joan*, he has honestly contributed *The Dreyfus Affair* or *Children in Uniform*.

In our time, however, many artists have gone over to the enemy. Their argument is that the institution is no longer an enemy when it's run by your friends; the Marxist writer withholds criticism once there is a Marxist government. There is a misunderstanding here. The artist's opposition is not to the party in power but to the facts of power as they will be under any regime. For him, therefore, to withhold criticism is to commit suicide. At this date, it is scarcely necessary to give instances.

What is necessary, rather, is to realize to what a large extent artists are withholding opposition even in America. Two well-known playwrights intimated in the *New York Times* that they no longer feel opposition is safe. There are two answers to this. One is that opposition was never safe: Zola was not safe when he wrote *J'accuse*. The other is that America is not yet as unsafe and unfree as certain liberals like to think. ("Freedom in America is hanging by a thread," one of them said in 1948, suggesting that by 1949, unless Wallace was elected, liberals would all be in concentration camps.) If our playwrights today are yes-men, it is not because it is impossible to say No.

These reflections are prompted by *End As A Man* by Calder Willingham which in play form has been promoted this fall from the De Lys to the Vanderbilt and from the Vanderbilt to the Lyceum. It is about the sadistic goings-on in a military academy. A generation ago, such happenings would have been taken as the material for an indictment of the military class and perhaps of the whole "system" to which it belongs. Admittedly, that is a limited interpretation of the subject, and the resulting play would no doubt have been rather narrow, abstract and doctrinaire. Had Mr. Willingham found a way to broaden the theme, one wouldn't dream of defending the earlier approach against his. But he is not more inclusive; he just switches sides, being *for* the army and *against* the individuals. And because he can cloak a more or less craven conformism in tough, not to say foul, language, he may be said to be grooming himself admirably for a totalitarian age. In *Death of a Salesman*, the older attitude of revolt was the strange bedfellow of the new conformism. Mr. Willingham seems just to drop the revolt and take a hint from Miller as to the form conformism should take—namely, a neurological fatalism. What does *End As A*

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Man prove? That, in the best of all possible worlds, where authorities are wise and everything is taken care of, a couple of young men are psychotic.

Perhaps, however, *End As A Man* belongs less importantly to the history of literature than to that of performance. It began, in fact, as a project of some of The Actors' Studio, a New York organization in which professional actors are enabled, through private philanthropy, to continue their training with the help of Elia Kazan or Lee Strasberg.

Last year I was Mr. Strasberg's guest at many sessions of the Studio and saw several dozen scenes enacted. My impressions, however superficial, were far too various to set down, even in summary, here. I will mention only how different the work is from the traditional English training I am familiar with. English training begins and ends with speech. This American training, influenced by Stanislavsky, concentrates, not on technique itself, but on a kind of truth, through which, it is hoped, the action on stage will come to life. On the just assumption that the art of acting has fallen on evil days, the Russo-American approach seems called for. Before we demand fine elocution or elegant gesture, we have a prior demand to make: that the stage be alive from instant to instant, that each instant carry us on to the next. For, like music, drama is nonstop action; until it moves, it cannot come into being.

In attending to this primary principle, the Studio actors serve their art well. Their limitation up to now, as it seems to me, is that movement, as they understand it, is too insistently movement of the nerves. Perhaps the plays they are given know no other dynamic. Or perhaps the playwrights limit themselves to what they know the actors can do. Whatever the explanation, where the principle of motion is sheer plot or where, say, evil is to be presented, and not just maladjustment, I have thought the Studio actors to be baffled and lost.

But *End As A Man*—even in its limitations—lends itself to their method: here is no vision of evil, just a glimpse of neurosis, no profound moral life, but a violent palpitation by which alone one instant is joined to the next. The actors render and sustain the palpitation with a remarkable skill, varying it—providentially—with the one heartenningly human feature of the play, which is humor. From the opening seconds of the performance, as with *Tea and Sympathy,* one senses that combination of energy and control which keeps a performance taut and an audience alert. The directing of Jack Garfein is full of good, "Kazan" touches, such as a pause filled by a cracking of knuckles, a hymn accompanied by rhythmic bangs on a trash can, speeches accompanied by hand-stands on the floor and other physical jerks on the bed.

There is not only Kazan's feverish rhythm but also his technical skill in timing a pause or building a climax. This is not a script well spoken to the accompaniment of pleasing gestures but a series of small actions rendered with emphasis on the tensions within each character and the tensions between one character and another. One remembers no speeches, but one remembers Ben Gazzara kicking his wardrobe in a rage; not because the kick is remarkable in itself, but because Gazzara times and prepares it so skillfully. And one recalls sequences of action, as when Gazzara pretends to be a green goblin in a football player's drunken imaginings and dances round him with a broom.

The publicity men, following up the broad hints of *Streetcar* and *Picnic,* are trying to offer up Gazzara on the altar of the new priapism. Joshua Logan had carried male nakedness as far as it could go from the head down, Garfein had started at the other end of his hero-villain, displaying him in shorts and garters. It wasn't really necessary: Gazzara can act. There is in his performance a very live contrast between an almost feline femininity and a bestiality so gross we call it masculine. A little of the English training in speech would not hurt Gazzara if he wants to play parts less uncouth. But his success is deserved, and praise is only invidious if it passes over the fact that William Smithers, Arthur Storch, and Paul Richards are equally brilliant in their roles.

Tension is tense. The old-fashioned actors you are likely to see in, let us say, Margaret Webster or Guthrie McClintic productions have no equivalent to offer. The life of *End As A Man* may be of a constricted sort but it is life. The Old Guard achieve something decent, dignified, and decorative—like a funeral.

Notes on the Critics

THIS REVIEW is the last essay by the late FELIX COHEN, philosopher, lawyer and expert on Immigration problems. Excerpts of his review have appeared in *The New Leader.* RICHARD CHASE teaches at Columbia University. LEON EDEL is finishing his biography of Henry James. MARY HIVNOR's criticism frequently appears in American periodicals.

MIDWINTER BROADWAY

THE PRESCOTT PROPOSALS by Howard Lindsay and Russel Crouse (Broadhurst Theatre). This youngest child of Broadway liberalism—not much humanity in the characters but plenty of humanitarianism in the dialogue—should stand its authors in good stead with McCarthy: it proves they know little of Communism and suggests they have never seen a Communist. When will the theatre give us a Russian who is a credible biped (I won't say human)? When will it give us a political play with characters instead of dull villains and duller do-gooders? Except in the theatre, politics are theatrical. Except in the drama, politics are dramatic. (I'm forgetting that Katharine Cornell is in this play; the program calls it to my attention.)

JOHN MURRAY ANDERSON'S ALMANAC (Imperial Theatre). It takes a lot to stop Hermione Gingold being funny, but they've made it. The laughs of the show are stolen by the artist who is most left on his own: Orson Bean. Also well worth while is the singing actor, Harry Belafonte—in handsome vitality, a negro Marlon Brando. There is one funny sketch—a take-off on *John Brown's Body*—by Jean Kerr. Billy de Wolfe is Miss Gingold's ally in her considerable, yet hardly successful, struggle with another of these supercolossal, musical fiascos. Booby prize: a singer called Polly Bergen who brings to the stage all the celluloid unction and nauseous intimacy of TV commercials.

OH, MEN! OH, WOMEN! by Edward Chodorov (Henry Miller's Theatre). Like most American light comedies, this one—about a psychoanalyst who after playing God is humanized by humiliation—is partly spoiled by the intrusion of seriousness. But Mr. Chodorov has a fine sense of humor, and when he's content to stay with it, he's brilliant. So are his casting and directing: one is reminded of the revived *Male Animal* of eighteen months ago. There are very amusing, yet subtle and shaded, performances, by Betsy von Furstenberg, Gig Young, Anne Jackson, and Larry Blyden. (Franchot Tone fights an uphill battle with a role that, in the circumstances, is impossible—because serious.) E. B.

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From Our Readers

► The President's Atomic Plan

Thank you for sending me a copy of the *New Republic* of December 21, containing an editorial of President Eisenhower's atomic plan. I have read your editorial twice critically, and I have to say only that I agree with it completely as an analysis of the problem with which we are confronted.

Of course, I am pleased to have any effort made that might possibly evolve into a solution of the problem which this country as well as the others all face, although I am told that there are other means of warfare as dreadful and devastating as is the atomic bomb or the hydrogen bomb. Nevertheless, I think your size-up of what is involved is entirely correct and I agree with it.

New York City CHESTER I. BARNARD

► Medical Quacks

Reading back over the *New Republic* I came across the charges leveled against my profession by Dr. Paul Hawley, Executive Director of the American College of Surgeons. Dr. Hawley had the nerve to assert that fee-splitting and ghost surgery were widespread among doctors. He had the gall to suggest that doctors should pay less attention to their patients' money and more to their health. Dr. R. B. Robbins, a former Vice-President of the AMA was quick to defend our outraged profession against these attacks. I laughed for a long time at Dr. Robbins' statement in reply that he never saw one case of ghost surgery. It reminds me of the Divisional Inspections we used to stage-manage for the Generals. What a farce!

Dr. Hawley's reproof does not apply, of course, to every case of "unnecessary" surgical intervention. Many women with fancied ills emanating from a neurotic or hysterical substratum seek the hurt of the knife to assuage a masochistic or sex need. Flagellation is no longer available for these masochists. But they can build up a very fine substitute after shopping around and finding a sympathetic surgeon. The Tissue Committee then has a nice bit of normal appendix or tube to play with!

Who's to blame? The culpable surgeon or the neurotic patient? As you correctly conclude what goes on throughout the land in small clinics and hospitals is really the unstressed but most important aspect of the situation. Where no control exists except a man's conscience more than likely the ethic *vs.* finance conflict loses out to verdiphilia (to coin a word for the lovers of the Green)!

Now to come to a part of the picture which is glossed over or ignored deliberately or otherwise.

This picture has two aspects. The first is the medical-surgical insurance coverage. Since the advent of the insurance and health-welfare plans with their inalterable fee schedules set at low levels many surgeons will recommend surgery willy-nilly at these figures in order to increase their incomes by volume inasmuch as middle- or lower-class patients cannot afford higher fees. The attitude is taken that it's not out of the patient's pocket anyhow SO WHAT THE H . . . (Where adequate fees prevail a more cautious surgical atmosphere prevails and where ethical surgery is associated with itemization of costs everyone should benefit.)

Part of the insurance aspect is a burgeoning method of mulcting the companies or plans by putting the patients through a small procedure but billing the insuror for a more serious surgical job. This can even be done, believe it or not, by performing a skin incision and closure only (not even going through the peritoneum) and then billing for a major procedure. Naturally, this is a conspiracy and cannot be done in well-administered large institutions. But it can be very easily accomplished in private clinics run on a personal basis. How can you detect this? In one case I know of—the patient developed the self-same symptoms of appendicitis a year later but went this time to another surgeon. Despite her story of having had her appendix out the previous year he insisted anew on the same diagnosis. Operation disclosed a red-hot appendix. Investigation showed that the insurance company had been billed that first time for a complete appendectomy. The second operation displayed a very pretty McBurney incision extending through skin only. Antibiotics cured the first attack. But—this is the pay-off! The insuror refused to pay again for the same operation!

The second cancerous development on our medical scene is the rise of the cultist. Perhaps early on they professed that disease was associated with some alleged derangement of some bone, joint or articulation requiring some kind of (peculiar) manipulation but, oh, how they have changed!

Through intense lobbying, with vote-buying and connivance the cultists have been able in many state legislatures to broaden their privileges so that, today, they can practise on the same basis as MD's from Grade-A medical schools. Since there are not many osteopathic surgeons the boys have to set up the cases on a scheduled basis; but the patient rarely finds out who the surgeon is. They have found out the clever way to effect a big return with a small bed-capacity hospital. Obviously, bed-turnover is the keystone of big incomes. The insurance plans pay the big fees for surgery, laboratory work, X-rays, electrocardiograms, etc., and only once for each item. So the smart operators see to it that the book is thrown at the patient in the first three or four days of hospitalization to get the maximum return and then since after that the patients stay on a daily ward or semi-private rate with no big return possible the cultists make every effort to kick them out.

As a result of these shenanigans by the bad-actors in the profession everyone gets a bad name; the hospitals are full to bursting, patients are complaining and some are dying from either neglect or improper surgery, necessary or otherwise. But now let's look for a moment at the other side.

Many doctors are upset by all the criticism concerning these facets of big-business medicine. Many are justifiedly angry because frequently the holier-than-thou attitude is expressed by a local get-rich-

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

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quick. Many doctors further resent the discrimination being practised against them. Who else is drafted up to age 51? I hear the loudest criticism of the medical profession from businessmen who have a fine time on corporation expense accounts, whose salary goes on during long vacations winter and summer and whose security is guaranteed by company pensions—and who never spent a day in college but who want FACS or FACP in their family medico.

The matter of military service for osteopaths is a sore point in many communities where all the young MD's were called into service during the war and still are eligible for future service. All the services refused to commission osteopaths and many were passed over by selective service with the result that in some communities the only available practitioners were DO's. And brother, they cleaned up! With the cessation of hostilities the returning vets were enticed to study at osteopathic schools under the GI bills. So we have the anomalous situation of the government paying for osteopathic training but refusing to commission the graduates who thereby are immune to further call whereas every MD grad worth his salt has or will be sent to Korea. This rankles and further embitters the medical profession.

Many of us lost 5 years of professional life and subconsciously the feeling exists that it has to be made up financially to ensure future security which is entirely a personal problem in each individual's case as no social security applies. So you can see why there has been such a rash of moneymaking surgery, insurance victimization, fee-splitting, pharmacy-refer schemes, followed by all the critical comments that arise from disgruntled or disgusted patients. Pressure for socialization of medicine is another side which enrages doctors as their contact with government medicine in the armed forces soured them for life on any political control.

What to do? The best answer lies in a small surgical FBI in every hospital—namely, the Tissue Committee. This requires proper organization of every hospital with representation of the public, press and clergy on each Board of Trustees. Most Boards are self-perpetuating groups of interested citizens who play their favorite's game assiduously. An adequate constitution with proper bylaws to safeguard the patients against wrong diagnosis, improper surgery, ghost surgery and fee-splitting under the table is a *sine qua non.* Furthermore, each worthy hospital must be departmentalized and approved by the ACS for interne instruction and have a resident pathologist on full time. No major privileges are to be permitted to any MD who does not have the requisite training or experience. Mere assisting a ghost should never qualify a designing bucko who uses his patients as guinea pigs!

Don't think that these are empty suggestions. If the Tissue Committee turns up too many normal appendices for a particular surgeon than he can be called to account! Likewise, too many stillborn babies are indicative of poor obstetrics. Sterilizations should only be done for definite reasons and not merely to escape the consequences of indulgence or folly.

The problem of equalizing the selective-service calls would help lighten the problems facing the medical profession. A step in the right direction has been taken under the newest doctor-draft law which has permitted service by men with minor ills or disabilities on a limited basis. Certainly, a man with a small hernia or that laughable hole in the eardrum now running a busy civilian practise can do the same at any army camp in the states. It is criminal to recall any doctor with prior service before some of the individuals who escaped service during World War II. All the osteopaths who likewise escaped service should be called into a service corps (like the optometrists) and after 24 months of active duty with vigorous instruction and examination they should be given an MD and separated honorably. This would be one way of initiating absorption of the better men into the medical profession—a step which will have to be taken ultimately just as Grade-C medical graduates were absorbed prior to World War I. The present schismatic attitudes among the MD's and DO's militates against reform and directly leads to myriad abuses.

The armed services should give up control of the medical corps and rank eliminated. Doctors should serve as doctors only and be given standing and pay *â la* civil service according to years, experience and specialty.

The whole problem must be considered in any attack on medico-surgical misdeeds since piecemeal singling-out of particular phases will never solve the situation. And remember, until the problem of assuring retirement security is solved so that doctors will be freed from the gnawing worry of economics you will never get wholesouled co-operation from all elements of the profession.

Regrettably, in these days of investigations I must ask that you keep my identity secret if you wish to publish this *tour de force.*

Cleveland, Ohio AEQUANIMATAS

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Bandwagon

The Senate and House leaders and committee chairmen who joined in the White House discussions over a period of three days are said to constitute the largest group ever to take part in a gathering of this kind. That in itself is significant. . . .

A second noteworthy fact about the conference is that Mr. Eisenhower had a program to present. – *The Washington Post, December 21, 1953.*

Irving S. Olds, retired chairman of the Board of Directors of US Steel, in a plea for funds for the Metropolitan Opera during a radio broadcast of *Rigoletto,* on December 12, 1953:

"And what has opera to do with business? If I may indulge in a two-syllable word: 'Everything.' "

At a news conference at which he said he hoped the Communists-in-government issue would be settled by election time, the President explained he meant he hoped that by then there would be no Communists left in government.

Since he didn't say specifically that he didn't object to Communists-in-government-under-Truman as an issue, it could be interpreted as meaning only that he didn't want Communists-in-government-under-Eisenhower as an issue. Then there's no conflict with Brownell and Hall.

"Eisenhower and Shanley are compatible," says a mutual acquaintance. "They seem to have a similarity of political ideas. Besides, both like to play golf. They like hunting. They have a lot in common." – *New York Times, December 20, 1953.*

Ah, and what a wealth of riches, at no cost to us, is to be noted all about us—an Autumn of colorful glory, a sky of stars, falling snowflakes, silently giving a robe to the golden leaves that fell in October and November, a singing stream, and a thrush's call. Sunshine and shadow, and the understanding look in the eye of a dog. – *The Tulsa World, November 28, 1953.*

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New Year's Greetings

From the Editor and the Publisher



The *New Republic* lead editorial in its first issue, November 7, 1914, ended with the words: "We set out with faith."

That faith will be put to its greatest test in 1954. For this year is the first year in which this Journal of Opinion must carry on without the family subsidy it has received since its founding 40 years ago.

1954 is sure to give the Editor and Publisher of the *New Republic* a new and deeper appreciation of Toynbee's thesis: survival depends on our capacity to rise to challenge.

The challenge is one we can only rise to together. First among our New Year's resolutions is one to produce a journal each week equal to the needs and opportunities of 1954. Among your resolutions we hope will be one to work to increase the number of *New Republic* subscriptions and so to continue its publication.

None of us are long on cash. All of us are rich in the capacity for hard work. So, to make it easier for all of us to keep our resolution, subscription booklets, each with 10 order blanks, have been printed. We shall send as many of these during the year as you request; we hope you will distribute them among your friends telling them what they are missing.

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The *New Republic* staff is ready to do battle with either Senators who fear freedom or bill collectors who fear they won't collect. We can handle the Senators. But we will very much welcome your assistance in convincing the collectors their fears are unfounded.

So, A happy, prosperous—and busy—New Year from us to you!

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